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Abstract
This paper presents a secure threshold cryptography scheme, referred here as CellTCS, designed based on the features of non-
linear hybrid Cellular Automata. CellTCS generates the secrets to be shared among m number of entities based on a simple logic
structure, however, to learn information about the original secret from k or less shares is an extremely difficult task. CellTCS is
effective in terms of efficiency, scalability and correctness.
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1. Introduction
A threshold cryptography scheme aims to protect a secret K by sharing among m number of entities in such that
only a qualified subset (say, k) of m can recover the key. The scheme ensures that it is not possible to learn any
information from k− 1 or less shares (Bozkurt, et al. 2007). Shamir (Shamir 1979) and Blakeley (Blakley 1979)
introduced the secret sharing concept for the first time independently. However, initially the concept was introduced
to protect secret from damage or loss. Later on during the past two decades, researchers have explored the possibilities
of applying the concept in various other cryptographic applications, such as multi-party computation protocol design,
two party key exchange protocol (Bhuyan, et al. 2012), access control mechanism, group-oriented cryptographic
application, e-voting schemes, electronic payment system, etc. The significance of threshold cryptography may be
illustrated with the help of examples, (i) Let us imagine a war-time situation, where confidential information keeps
on flowing to the military headquarters all of the time say through the insecure wireless networks. All the data are
encrypted with a secret key. If the key to decrypt the messages is given to a single individual then there would be
the possibility of misuse. Also distributing the key to all m members in such a way that all the members have to
give their shares to decrypt the message would be inconvenient on the other hand if the secret could be decrypted by
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any k subset of m shares then the security of the data is ensured and also the task of decrypting the keys is flexible.
(ii) Also network may be made fault tolerant. Let us imagine a network with m nodes is provided a secret and this
secret is required to carry out any communication. The secret is distributed amongst all the nodes in the network such
that any k subset of shares can reconstruct the secret back. In this situation even if some of the nodes fail even then
the network will carry out communication as before provided k nodes are available for functioning in the network.
During the past two decades, several novel threshold cryptography schemes have been introduced based on mostly
polynomial interpolation, modular arithmetic using Chinese remainder theorem, intersection finding on k-dimensional
hyperplane, cellular automata (PalChaudhuri, et al. 1997) etc. In (Shamir 1979), the author uses finite field polynomial
equations to construct a scheme for threshold cryptography. A prime number p is taken, where, p′s value is greater
than the number of possible shares or secrets and also greater than the largest possible secret. A random polynomial
of degree (k−1) is obtained by considering m arbitrary points lying on the polynomial. as follows:
f (x) = d0+d1x
1+ d2x
2+ . . .+ dk−1xk−1(mod p) (1)
where d0 is the secret and the shares are obtained by evaluating the polynomial at xi, i lies between 0 to m− 1. The
shares are distributed amongst several parties but to reconstruct the secret d0 any subset of shares of a given minimum
size, say k, is required. The reconstruction is done using Lagrange interpolation. A point can be reconstructed, on a
polynomial of degree k, when at least k+1 points can be put together. In (Asmuth & Bloom 1983), the authors take a
prime number, p greater than the secret M. Then a set of m(< p) numbers d1,d2, . . . ,dm in ascending order is chosen
such that the di’s are relatively prime to each other. Also d0 ∗d1 ∗ . . .∗dk → p∗dn−k+2 ∗dn−k+3 ∗ . . . ∗dm, where k is
the minimum number of shares required to reconstruct the secret. For the distribution of the shares, a random value r
is chosen to computeM′ =M+ rp. The shares are: ki =M′mod di. Using the Chinese remainder theorem the secret
can be reconstructed using any k shares, however, the authors have claimed that with number of shares ≤ (k− 1), it
is impossible to reconstruct the original secret. Again, in another vector scheme (Blakley 1979), the authors consider
points in space and planes to construct shares and to reconstruct the secret. The secret is assumed to be a point
in a k-dimensional space. The shares are equations of (k− 1) dimensional hyperplane that form the k-dimensional
space and give the secret at the point of their intersection. The authors have established that the reconstruction of
the original secret is equivalent of finding the exact point of intersection of hyperplane over k-dimensional space,
which is an extremely difficult task. In (Karnin, et al. 1983), the authors choose (m+ 1) vectors V0,V1, . . . ,Vm of
dimension k. Any k ∗ k square matrix formed by these vectors has rank k. U denote row vector of dimension m+ 1.
Here, M = U ∗V0 is the matrix product. The shares are obtained by U.Vi where i = 1 to m. Any k shares can be
used to solve the m ∗m system of linear equations to give the matrix. Any k− 1 shares cannot solve the system of
linear equations as the unknowns are the coefficients of U ∗U ∗V0. Hence k−1 shares cannot recover the secret. In
a Secret Audio scheme (Naskar, et al. 2011), the authors use secret audio files in binary bits to create shared secrets.
The file is divided into m shares and any k(< m) shares can give back the secret. The idea behind is that every share
has some bits missing. And these missing bits can be recovered from a set of exactly k− 1 shares. Thus a given
bit position can be confirmed from any k shares but not less than that. Hence k shares are required to give back
the secret. During the past few years, several other secret sharing schemes have been developed based on Cellular
Automata (CA). In (Eslami & Zarepour Ahmadabadi 2010), the authors propose a verifiable (t,n)-threshold multi-
secret sharing scheme, based on one-dimensional cellular automata where the number of secrets is not restricted by
n or t. In contrast to O(nlog2n) complexity of Shamir-based sharing schemes, this scheme proposal achieves linear
computational complexity. In another CA based work (Hernandez-Encinas, et al. 2002), the authors have developed a
visual cryptography (referred as graphic cryptography) scheme using 2-D CA. A visual cryptography scheme divides
the original image into several equal-sized parts or shades. The shares or parts are made in such a way that to recover
the original image it is necessary to join or superimpose at least t shades. Again, in (Jafarpour, et al. 2007), the
authors propose a cheating model for the secret sharing schemes based on linear memory CA. the authors present a
novel uniformmodel for representation of all secret sharing schemes based on CA. Based on our limited survey, it has
been observed that following are the major issues:(i) the shares should be easy to generate, but it should be extremely
difficult (if not impossible) to generate the original secret with number of shares < k, (ii) the scheme should perform
correctly towards reconstruction of the original secret for any combination of ≥ k out of m shares, (iii) discovery of
any partial secret information should not be of any great help in the prediction/estimation of the original secret, and
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(iv)it should be fast, easy to implement and scalable. This paper introduces a secure threshold cryptography scheme
(CellTCS) that addresses all the issues reported above. CelTCS is designed based on (i) the properties of group and
non-group non-linear hybrid 3-NeighborhoodCAs and (ii) rule based shared secrets generation and its reconstruction.
3-N CAs have already been established as an effective tool for the construction of efficient cryptography scheme.
2. CA Basics
Wolfram pioneered the study of cellular automata, CA as a mathematical model for self-organizing statistical
systems (PalChaudhuri et al. 1997, Das & RoyChowdhury 2010, Bhattacharyya & Nandi 2000). The CA structure
can be viewed as a lattice of cells where every cell takes values either 1 or 0. Each cell evolves in each step depending
on some combinational logic on itself and its neighbors. Such a CA is called 3-Neighborhood CA. Or we can say
that Cellular automata (CA) are computational models to represent complex computations in a simplified manner.
They can undergo state change to represent the results obtained upon the execution of computational steps. They can
perform computations with only local information meaning only the states of the automata which are its immediate
neighbors affect the state of the automata. The structure of a CA can be viewed as a set of discrete states (or cells)
where each cell can assume either the value 0 or 1. At discrete time step(clock cycle), the evolution of a site value
depends on some rule(a combinational function), which is a function of the present state of k of its neighbors for a
k-neighborhood CA, the evolution of ith can be represented as a function of the present states of (i−1)th, ith,(i+1)th
cells as:qi(t+1) = f (qi−1(t),qi(t),qi+1(t)), Where f represents a combinational function or the next state function.
The state transition diagram of Cellular Automata have been characterized using the matrix and its characteristic
polynomial. In this Cellular Automata, there are 8 distinct neighborhood configurations and 28 distinct mappings from
all these neighborhood mappings to the next state of the automata; each mapping represents a CA rule (PalChaudhuri
et al. 1997). A Cellular Automata with all cells having linear rules is called a linear CA (PalChaudhuri et al. 1997, Das
& RoyChowdhury 2010). Characterization of linear/additive CA is much simpler than the other classes of CA due
to its correspondence with the state-of-art algebraic models. Depending on the nature of the state transition behavior,
linear/Additive CA can be broadly classified into two classes: (i)Group CA 2 and (ii) Non-Group CA. In a group
CA, each state has a unique successor and a unique predecessor state. So it is possible to get back to the previous
state upon requirement. It is ideal for pseudorandom sequence generation. In a non-group CA, each of its states don’t
have a single predecessor. So it is not possible to go back to the previous state as the previous state is ambiguous.
A Cellular Automata with all cells having non-linear rules (AND, OR logic) is called Non-linear CA (PalChaudhuri
et al. 1997, Das & RoyChowdhury 2010, Bhattacharyya & Nandi 2000). These automata are more suitable for
cryptographic applications because of the diversity in their behavior. Different types of sequences produced by 3-N
CA are reported next.
(a) Maximum Length Group CA: The maximum length group CA when allowed to form a sparse matrix gives us non-
zero determinant. If a particular cell is taken in 3-Neighborhood group CA then it goes through 2n− 1 different
states and comes back to the same initial state.
(b) Non Maximum Length Group CA: The non-maximum length group CA when allowed to form a sparse matrix
gives us non-zero determinant. If a particular cell is taken in a 3-Neighborhood group CA then it goes through a
given number of different states (< 2n− 1) and comes back to the same state.
(c) Irreversible Behavior of Group CA: The irreversible group CA when allowed to form a sparse matrix may give
either zero or non-zero determinant. Any given cell goes through 2n− 1 steps but it does not come back to the
same initial state. It is so because of the formation of some intermediate cycle(s) called basin. When a basin is
formed at any given step then the cell forms a loop in that step. The cell never comes back to its initial state when
it exhibits the behavior of an irreversible group CA.
Based on our study, it has been observed that group and non-group CAs are extremely useful tools for developing
security schemes. the modular, cascadable and local neighborhood structure makes these CAs more attractive in the
cryptographic scheme development. This paper makes an attempt to develop a secure threshold cryptography scheme,
referred here as CellTCS, based on the properties of group and non group CAs. Next we describe the scheme stepwise.
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3. CellTCS: The Proposed CA based Threshold Cryptography Scheme
The proposed CellTCS is described in two major steps: (a) Generation of shared secret, based on original secret
using maximum-length non-linear group CAs and a method proposed in (Naskar et al. 2011) and (b) Reconstruction
of the original secret. Step (a) is comprised of three individual steps for every byte of the secret: (a1) Taking a byte
from the original secret, (a2) Convert the byte to a n−bit number based on a maximum length non-linear group CA,
and finally, (a3) Shared Secret Generation based on a variant of the method proposed in (Naskar et al. 2011).
3.1. Problem Specification
The problem of secret share generation and its reconstruction can be defined in two steps: (a) Creation of Shared
Secrets, here, for a given secret f and a rule id, provided by the user,m shared secrets i.e. f1, f2, f3, . . . , fm are obtained.
These shares so obtained are not related in any way and also it is difficult to guess the original secret from these shares.
(b) Secret Reconstruction, here conversely, given k of these secrets g1,g2, . . . ,gk to reconstruct the original secret f .
However, if number of valid shares is less than or equal to (k−1) then the secret cannot be reconstructed.
3.2. Algorithms
(a) Algorithm for sharing secret: It accepts secret f and rule id rid as inputs and generates shared secrets f1, f2, . . . , fm
as outputs. The first function converts a n− bit number x into m n−bit shares x1,x2, . . . ,xm. A function S : Zn→
P(Im) which is previously generated (can be generated randomly) as a table will be used by share secret(x). Here
Zn = {0 . . .n− 1} and P(Im) is the set of subsets of Im = {1 . . . .m}. For every i ∈ Zn, S(i) is a set with k− 1
elements.
Algorithm 1 share secret (x)
x1,x2, . . . ,xm ← 0
for i= 0→ n−1 do
if ith bit of x is 1 then
for j = 1→ m do
if j does not belong to S(i) then
set ith bit of x, to 1
end if
end for
end if
end for
return (x1,x2, . . . ,xm)
The second function prepares two tables tmap and invtmap for the rule vector rlv. The rule vector consists of a
field n which gives the length of the CA used, v0, a starting vector of GF(2n) and an array of n numbers in the
range 0−255, the ith number indicating the truth table used at the ith position of the CA. the CA gives an operator
T (in general, non-linear) in GF(2n). the rules included in the database give maximum length non-linear group
CA i.e, the operator T has a maximum cycle length. In the main algorithm, with the rule id, rid given by the
user, a rule vector rlv is read from a rule database. Then preparetable(rlv, tmap, invtmap) is called to prepare the
tables tmap and invtmap. The rid is converted to m shares rid1 ,rid2 , . . . ,ridm which are written out to f1, f2, . . . , fm
respectively. After that each byte (in the range 0-255) given in the secret f is converted into a n−bit number x by
the table tmap (i.e, x = tmap(c)) which is then further converted into m shares x1,x2, . . . ,xm which are written out
to f1, f2, . . . , fm respectively.
(b) Algorithm for reconstructing the secret f : It accepts shared secrets g1,g2, . . . ,gk as inputs and outputs original
secret f . The first function puts together k n−bit shares y1,y2, . . . ,yk to reconstruct a n−bit secret number y. The
function preparetable(rlv, tmap, invtmap) discussed in the previous algorithm is also used by this algorithm. In the
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Algorithm 2 preparetable(rlv, tmap, invtmap)
x = rlv.v0
form the operator T from rlv
for i= 0→ 2n−1 do
invtmap[i] = −1
end for
for i= 0→ 255 do
if (invtmap[x] not equal to −1) then
exit with ”wrong CA” message
end if
tmap[i] = x
invtmap(x) = i
x = T(x)
end for
Algorithm 3Main algorithm for sharing secret
Get rid
Read rlv from Rule database for rid
Prepare table(rlv, tmap, invtmap)
(rid1 ,rid2 , . . . ,ridm) = share secret(rid)
Write (rid1 ,rid2 , . . . ,ridm) to f1, f2, . . . , fm
for every byte c of f do
x= tmap(c)
(x1,x2, . . . ,xm) = share secret(x)
Write x1,x2, . . . ,xm to f1, f2, . . . , fm
end for
Algorithm 4 reconstruct(y1,y2, . . . ,yk)
y= y1
for i= 2→ k do
y= y(bitwise OR)yi
end for
return y
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main algorithm for reconstruction, initially the first n−bit number yi is read from gi and y1,y2, . . . ,yk are used to
reconstruct the rule id rid . the rule id is used to read the rule vector rlv from the rule database and using this the
tables tmap and invtmap are prepared. Thereafter till all the numbers in g1,g2, . . . ,gk are exhausted, y1,y2, . . . ,yk
are read from g1,g2, . . . ,gk, reconstructed to get x and c is obtained by invtmap(x) and written to the output secret
f . If at any stage invtmap(x) = −1, it signifies an error.
Algorithm 5Main algorithm for share reconstruction
Read n−bit numbers y1,y2, . . . ,yk from g1,g2, . . . ,gk.
rid = reconstruct(y1,y2, . . . ,yk).
Read rlv from Rule Database for rid .
Prepare Table (rlv, tmap, invtmap).
repeat
Read y1,y2, . . . ,yk from g1,g2, . . . ,gk
x = reconstruct(y1,y2, . . . ,yk)
c = invtmap(x)
if c=−1 then
exit with error message
end if
Write c into f
until numbers of (g1,g2, . . . ,gk) are exhausted
4. Analysis of the algorithm
As identified in (Desmedt & Holloway 1997, Desmedt & Frankel 1990, Desmedt & Yair 1991), in this section we
establish our scheme in terms of four important measures.
(a) Efficiency : In the algorithm for sharing the secrets, after the initial constant amount of work done for preparing
the tables tmap and invtmap, for every byte of the secret, a table lookup gives the corresponding n− bit numbers
from which m shares are obtained in m steps. The time-complexity for calculating the shares is thus O(smn)
where s is the size of the secret. Each share of the secret is twice in size of that of the secret and hence the
space-complexity is also O(smn). For reconstruction after the initial constant amount of work done for preparing
the tables, for reconstructing a byte of the secret, k n−bit numbers of the shared secrets are combined in k steps
and then a table lookup gives the original byte. The time-complexity is thus O(skn).
(b) Scalability: The efficiency analysis given above shows that the algorithms for secret share generation and their
reconstruction are linear in the length of the secret, the numbers of shares and the length of the cellular automaton
used. Hence the proposed CellTCS is scalable.
(c) Correctness: We first prove that the bitwise OR of any k shares of a n−bit number x is nothing but x. If the ith bit
of x is zero, then share secret(x) sets the ith bit of all the shares to zero. Hence the OR of any of these k bits is zero
and the ith bit of x is correctly reconstructed to zero. If the ith bit of x is 1, the ith bit of x j is set to 1 if j does not
belong to S(i). Since S(i) has precisely k−1 elements, if k shares are chosen then atleast one of the shares (say the
jth share) will satisfy j does not belong to S(i) and the OR of the ith bit of the shares will correctly yield 1. Hence
if we take the bitwise OR of any k shares we will get back x. Next we observe that the function preparetable
ensures that (invtmap(tmap(c)) = c). Thus if a byte c of the secret is converted to x by tmap (i.e, x = tmap(c)) and
then m secret shares x1,x2, . . . ,xm are constructed from x, then by the above x is obtained correctly from any k of
the shares and then invtmap correctly gives c since the following equation holds, and it proves that CellTCS works
correctly.
invtmap(x) = invtmap(tmap(c)) = c (2)
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(d) Secret reconstruction with incorrect or unauthorized subset (< k) of correct shares: Suppose we are given k−1
shares xα1 ,xα2 , . . . ,xαk−1 . Consider all the bit positions i st Si = {xα1 ,xα2 , . . . ,xαk−1}. If the ith position of x is 1
then all these k− 1 shares will have zero in the ith bit and their OR will give zero incorrectly. Even if only one
bit comes out incorrect, the subsequent invtmap(x) will in general render several bits wrong. Suppose, n= 16, Let
c= 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
tmap(c) = x= 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
i= 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
i = 4 and S(4) = {3,5} and we take the shares x3 and x5. When we take x′ = x3 OR x5, then 4th bit of x′ is zero
which is not the same as that of x. Suppose this is the only bit that is wrong, i.e Since tmap and invtmap are very
x′ 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
rapid changing functions c′ = invtmap(x′)may be quite different from c. For example c′ may be 11001101 when 5
bits are wrong out of 8. The same kind of errors in reconstruction will result if k shares are taken but one or more
of them are incorrect.
5. Conclusions and Future Research Directions
A secure threshold cryptography scheme, designed based on the properties of 3-N maximum-length group and non-
group non-linear CAs is presented. The scheme is dynamic and programmable, and its local-neighborhood structure
provides scalability and simplicity from implementation point of view. Extension of CellTCS towards faster secret
share generation and its subsequent reconstruction, for multi-media data is underway.
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